Efforts to enforce compulsory schooling by linking welfare assistance to school attendance are rarely successful in themselves. One reason is a lack of credibility: targeted families may anticipate that welfare administrators will be reluctant to withdraw support when attendance does not improve.
Introduction
All advanced, industrialized countries have compulsory schooling laws with high levels of compliance; non-compliance is generally limited to a small fraction of families, many of them living in deprivation. Making sure these children attend school regularly is a key element in breaking the intergenerational chain of poverty, yet full enforcement often proves difficult. Options for intervention are limited: removing truant children from their families is an extreme measure that cannot be implemented except in special cases; and providing parents with positive inducements to send their children to school, such as the conditional cash transfers (CCT) now offered in some developing countries (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005) are expensive and unpopular in developed countries inasmuch as they reward parents of truant children for complying with the law. One policy approach implemented in the United States in a number of settings involves linking welfare payments to school attendance, on the assumption that the threat of withholding payments will be sufficient to deter truancy. Reviewing such programs, Campbell and Wright (2005) , conclude that unless accompanied by case management resources, they do not significantly improve attendance. In many instances, caseworkers find valid reasons for non-compliance; in others, targeted families were unaware of the threat of withholding welfare payments. In general, welfare administrators appreciate that withholding payments will harm the very children they are trying to help and resist following through, and targeted families, realizing this, do not respond. This raises the question, whether more credible threats might achieve different results.
Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) provides a unique opportunity to answer this question. SEAM threatened to withhold welfare payments from Indigenous parents in the Northern Territory whose children failed to meet school attendance requirements. It was implemented against the backdrop of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER), an intervention directed at the Northern Territory's Indigenous population in response to allegations of child sex abuse in their communities, which involved a military presence and temporary suspension of Australia's Racial Discrimination Act (Broome, 2010) . 2 While formally separate from the NTER, SEAM gained credibility from the heightened anxiety generated by the NTER, which was further reinforced by the living memory of yet severer, purportedly well-meaning measures to which Indigenous Australians had been subjected by Australian governments in the past. 3 In this paper we estimate SEAM's impact on school attendance and learning achievement among the population of Indigenous children in the Northern Territory. To this purpose we apply a difference-in-difference analysis to data from the National Assessment Program-Language Arts and Numeracy (NAPLAN) on participation rates and test score averages in reading and numeracy, in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9, comparing the difference between Indigenous participation and performance in the Northern Territory and Indigenous participation and performance across Australia's states and territories, between 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented, and subsequent years to 2012. 4 Previewing our main results, we find that in 2009, the first year in which SEAM was implemented, test participation increased dramatically among Indigenous children in the Northern Territory, by [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] percentage points compared to pre-SEAM levels (in 2008) of about 70%, where no similar increase was witnessed among the Indigenous populations of Australia's other states and territories.
Surprisingly, this sharp rise in participation rates did not lower test means, suggesting that the academic ability of those induced to sit the test by SEAM was similar, on average, to that of students who would have taken the test absent intervention. Consequently, in 2009 the share of each cohort achieving the minimum standard on these tests increased substantially, by 5 to 10 percentage points over its 2008 level of about 30%, where again no similar increase was witnessed among the Indigenous populations of other states and territories.
However, these achievements could not be sustained. The threat of withholding welfare payments from the remaining Indigenous parents whose children failed to meet school attendance requirements was not carried out except in a handful of cases; and as this was observed and became widely known, participation rates fell off. The following year, 2010, saw an erosion of about half the gains achieved the year before. By 2012, the last year in our study, participation rates had fallen substantially from their peak in 2009 but remained significantly above the baseline levels of 2008.
However, nearly all the gains in the share of the cohort achieving minimum standard evaporated.
These findings demonstrate that a credible threat to link welfare payments to school attendance can substantially raise participation rates and learning achievement. Yet this increase could not be sustained even in the unique circumstances of the NTER, as the threat of withholding welfare 3 The most extreme of these policies was the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families by Australian Federal and State government agencies, which continued until as recently as 1969. In 2008, then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issued a formal recognition and apology for what has come to be called "The Stolen Generations". 4 We only had access to publicly available aggregate data. If individual-level data is released it will be possible to carry out more detailed analyses that may shed further light on this unique experience. payments proved hollow. Of the parents induced by SEAM to send their children to school in 2009, some continued to do so in subsequent years, when they no longer felt threatened, but many did not.
Presumably, they still did not see the value in conventional schooling-whether due to the importance they attached to traditional activities not well served by conventional education, 5 or because they saw limited opportunities for their children in the Australian labor market.
This indicates that even when threats to link welfare payments to school attendance are initially credible, the gains they achieve are largely temporary. In themselves, they programs offer at best an opportunity to demonstrate to parents that sending their children to school is worthwhile on its own merits. For them to have an effect in the longer term, parents' perceptions of the value of schooling must be changed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory; Section 3 describes the NTER and SEAM initiatives; Section 4 presents descriptive statistics on the impact of SEAM on education outcomes in the Northern Territory; Section 5 presents results of regression analysis of the data; and Section 6 concludes.
Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory
Indigenous Australians exhibit markedly weaker aggregate indicators of well-being compared to non-Indigenous Australians in many important dimensions such as life expectancy, education levels, health outcomes, employment, family and community violence, incarceration and freedom from poverty (Stephens, 2010; SCRGSP, 2011) . The gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians is especially large in the Northern Territory, where a larger share of the Indigenous population lives in remote locations, and where they are an overwhelming majority and many maintain a traditional way of life.
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Life expectancy. The most recent estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 7 put the life expectancy of Indigenous Australian men at 67 years, twelve years less than the Australian average, and that of Indigenous Australian women at 73 years, ten years below average. The average life expectancy of an Indigenous man or woman in the Northern Territory is about 2 years less than the average Indigenous Australian-slightly less than the average life expectancy in Bangladesh.
Education. Participation in the National Assessment Program for Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) in 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented, averaged over 90% for the Australian population at large; just under 80% for all Indigenous Australians; and about 70% for the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory (slightly more in grades 3 and 5; slightly less in grades 7 and 9). In 2012, more than 1 in 5 Indigenous students in Australia performed below the national minimum standard in year 3 numeracy and reading compared to 1 in 30 non-Indigenous Australian students. At the same time, almost 60% of year 3 Indigenous students in the Northern Territory scored below the national minimum standard on the numeracy and reading component of NAPLAN;
in grade 9 about 67% failed to meet minimum standards. Nonetheless, the unemployment rate among the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory was among the lowest among Indigenous Australians. This was partly due to the Community Development Employment Project (CDEP), a work for welfare scheme that was especially common in remote areas, where approximately 80% of Indigenous persons in the Northern Territory live (Hunter and Gray, 2012) . 10 Altman, Buchanan and Biddle (2006) describe Indigenous employment in Australia as divided among three sectors: the private or market sector; the public sector (predominately CDEP); and the customary or informal sector, which includes activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering, production of art and crafts, and land, habitat and species management participation. Employment in the customary or informal sector is especially large in remote Indigenous communities, which account for a disproportionately large fraction of the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory. Ignoring employment in this third, non-market sector, as ABS statistics do, effectively underestimates the level of employment among the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory.
Recognizing its importance leads to a more realistic assessment of the opportunity cost of conventional schooling and hence to a further downward revision of the already low returns to schooling that Indigenous families in remote areas can reasonably anticipate. 
The perception of SEAM within the context of the NTER
The impact of the School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) on education outcomes, on which we focus in this paper, can only be understood against the backdrop of the controversial Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) or "Northern
Territory Intervention" initiated shortly before it, for although SEAM was not part of the NTER, it was the operational context of the NTER that lent SEAM much of its initial credibility. formally targeted a small population of parents receiving Centrelink (welfare) payments with children in one of fourteen schools in six trial areas. Table 2  It was directed at Indigenous children in remote areas.
 All carers (including grandmothers and aunts) would have their payments suspended if they were caring for a truant child.
 All Indigenous families in trial locations were subject to SEAM, including waged families and families participating in CDEP.
 Non-compliance with SEAM would trigger immediate suspension of payments, rather than requiring a compliance period as was actually the case.
In fact, of the 989 parents deemed within scope of the SEAM program in 2009 none had their payments suspended for failure to comply (DEEWR, 2011) . The stated policy goal of SEAM was to increase enrolments, and 918 parents (1604 children) were sent enrolment notification letters which requested they provide their child's school enrolment details to Centrelink within 14 days. According to the DEEWR evaluation report the overall non-compliance rate was 170 parents (286 children). Of these, 56 parents (84 children) were sent enrolment warning notices, the final step before having their benefits suspended. The majority complied but eleven chose to move out of the scope of the program (effectively this was the most severe sanction for non-compliance in 2009). The strong threats implicit in the information campaign that accompanied the initial implementation in 2009
were not carried out.
The impact of SEAM on educational outcomes: Descriptive statistics
While raising school enrollment and attendance rates was the immediate target of SEAM its ultimate goal was to have a positive impact on learning achievement. We did not have access to individual enrolment or attendance data that would have allowed us to track changes in Indigenous attendance rates. However, we are able to estimate the impact of SEAM on learning outcomes from NAPLAN participation and achievement data.
13 Tables 3 and 4 presents comparative summary statistics on NAPLAN outcomes in two knowledge domains, reading and numeracy, averaged over four grade levels (3, 5, 7, and 9), in five successive years: from 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented to 2012. They illustrate vividly both the immediate impact, in 2009, of the perceived threat of SEAM on education outcomes in the Northern Territory, and the abatement of this effect in subsequent years as it became increasingly apparent that the threat of withholding welfare payments was not being carried out.
Three indicators are presented in these tables: the participation rate, the share of students in the cohort above minimum standard, and the pass rate. The participation rate is defined as the percentage of students participating in the NAPLAN test (including students exempted by the school) as a percentage of the total number of students in the year level.
14 The share of students in the cohort 13 NAPLAN comprises five knowledge domains (numeracy, reading, grammar, spelling and writing). Each year, in midMay, the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority (ACARA) administers tests in each domain to all Australian students in grades 3, 5, 7, and 9. The data reported here are from the 2008-2012 NAPLAN National Reports published by ACARA, and available at http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html.
14 Non-participating students are students classified as absent or withdrawn (by the parents).
above minimum standard is defined for grade level g and knowledge domain d in year t (say, grade 7 numeracy in 2010) as:
(1)
where P gdt is the number of students in grade g participating in the test in knowledge domain d in year t , M gdt is the number of students scoring below minimum standard on that test, and T gt is the total number of students in grade g in year t. This is distinct from our third indicator, the pass rate, which is the percentage of students participating in the test who scored above minimum standard. It is defined as Subsequent years saw yet further gains in reading pass rates and fluctuating changes in numeracy.
We take this as indicating that those who were not taking NAPLAN tests absent SEAM, but were induced to do so by SEAM, had similar academic ability, especially in reading, to students who participated in NAPLAN before SEAM was implemented.
This rise in participation rates without a commensurate decline in pass rates resulted in immediate Again this pattern is unique to the Northern Territory; no other state or territory exhibits a similar pattern. Territory (the black line) to Australia's other states and territories (the gray lines). We find significant differences between the two knowledge domains and among grade levels. In reading we find a substantial increase of about ten percentage points, from about 20% to about 30%, in grades 3, 5 and 7, followed by a very mild decline that leaves much of the initial gain intact, while grade 9 shows no systematic effect. Trends in numeracy, in Figure 4 , are less pronounced with more fluctuation.
Nonetheless we see here, too, increases in the share reaching minimum standard from 2008 to 2009 in grades 5, 7 and 9 (the largest increase is in grade 5), followed by a decline in 2010; there is no increase for grade 3 
The impact of SEAM on educational outcomes: Regression analysis
To further characterize SEAM's impact on participation and learning outcomes among the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory, we apply regression analysis to our data, using a difference-in-differences approach to estimate average annual effects of SEAM on participation rates and on the percentage of students above minimum standard. We assume that the entire Indigenous population of the Northern Territory was untreated in 2008, before implementation of SEAM; then fully treated in 2009 by the credible threat of having welfare payments withheld from parents who did not send their children to school; and then partially or ineffectively treated in subsequent years as the threat lost its credibility.
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The Indigenous populations of other states and territories are taken to be untreated in all years and grade levels, and both knowledge domains.
We estimate each of our two equations over all eight states and territories in Australia, pooling all years and grade levels, and in both knowledge domains, thus taking Australia's other seven states and territories as our control group. As we showed in Section 3, the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory is different from that in other states and territories in other respects as well, not only in not being subject to SEAM. To test the robustness of our results to the choice of control group we first apply the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010) , which automatically constructs an artificial control from the other states and territories by weighting them based on pre-treatment covariates.
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Then we use placebo tests on all states and territories to construct a non-parametric test of the robustness of our results.
The basic difference-in-differences specification
For our basic difference-in-differences specification we pool the data over five years (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) The results of the two regressions-for participation and share above minimum standardare presented in Table 5 . Considering first the participation equation, in the left panel of Table 5 , we find that the average participation rate of the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory in 2008 is a highly 17 The key assumption here is that treatment is independent of the stochastic component.
significant 21.1 percentage points lower than the average rate for the Indigenous populations of other states and territories in grade 9, and 8-11 percentage points lower in the lower grades; there was no significant difference in participation rates between numeracy and reading; and participation rates in 2008 were generally higher than in subsequent years by 1.7-2.6 percentage points.
Our main quantities of interest in these equations are the difference in difference coefficients,  t , estimating the time variation of Indigenous participation in the Northern Territory compared to the time variation of Indigenous outcomes in other states and territories. They appear in the shaded bottom four rows of Table 5 . We find a highly significant effect of 19. 
Synthetic control estimates
The appropriateness of the difference in differences approach rests on the assumption that absent any treatment the potential change over time in the outcome variable, after controlling for observables, should be the same for the control and treated groups. This assumption gains plausibility the more similar are the treatment and control groups prior to treatment. Our basic regression used the Indigenous population in all other states and territories as our control group, though some are very different from the Northern Territory.
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A synthetic control is a weighted average of potential control units that best approximates the treated unit prior to treatment on relevant observable covariates, thus achieving greater similarity between treatment and control units (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010 We therefore re-estimate the regressions in Table 5 over just two geographic units: the Northern Territory and the state of Western Australia, its synthetic control. The results are presented in Table 6 . base-year value is again smaller, 5.5 percentage points compared to 8.5. Making the same comparison for the share above minimum standard we find that the estimates using WA as the synthetic control yield smaller, though not statistically different, estimated coefficients. The difference in results between the two methods is the result of two effects. The first is, the greater similarity of the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory to the Indigenous population of Western Australia, which should reduce a possible bias arising from differences between the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory and less similar Indigenous populations in states and territories other than Western Australia. The second is the greater random variation associated with outcomes in a single state, which are averaged out when the full set of states is included in the regression. We cannot say how much of the difference should be attributed to each effect and treat the fairly narrow range between the two sets of estimates as setting upper and lower bounds on the actual treatment effect.
Placebo tests
To further test the robustness of our results, we construct a placebo test for the initial treatment effect. Placebo tests are widely used to show that an effect that has been identified is not spurious (DiNardo and Pischke 1997; Angrist and Krueger 1999; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) . For each state and territory we construct a synthetic control and calculate the difference in difference in outcome variables between 2008 and 2009 within each grade-domain:
where Y idgt is as before the outcome for state or territory i in knowledge domain d and grade g; and c(i) is the synthetic control for state or territory i. We then compare the treatment effect across all states and territories. The results for participation rates in NAPLAN are presented in Table 7 , and for the share achieving minimum standard in Table 8 .
Considering first the treatment effect on participation rates, in Table 7 , we find that for both domains and across all grade levels, the highest values are in the Northern Territory with the exception of year 9 numeracy, where Queensland and Tasmania show stronger effects. The probability of achieving a result "as good" as this from random permutations,
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(1/8)
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(3/8), is less than 10 -6
. Averaging the treatment effects on participation for the Northern Territory across all grade levels and both knowledge domains we obtain a value of 17.6, slightly higher than the value obtained from the regression with the synthetic control. .
Averaging the treatment effects on share achieving minimum standard for the Northern Territory across all grade levels and both knowledge domains we obtain a value of 5.8, again slightly higher than the value obtained from the synthetic control regression. 20 The probability of ranking first in a random drawing from eight states/territories is 1/8; the probability of this happening seven times, assuming the draws are independent is (1/8)
; and the probability of ranking in the first three places is 3/8. Table 9 presents the different estimates obtained for the various treatment effects from the three methods used: difference-in-differences regressions using all states/territories as controls (columns 1 and 4); difference-in-differences regressions using only Western Australia as the counterfactual (columns 2 and 5); and the average effect obtained from a disaggregated calculation of difference-indifferences effects between the Northern Territory and Western Australia, its synthetic control (columns 3 and 6). Notes: The estimates in columns 3 and 6 are the average of all Northern Territory synthetic control estimates from row 8 in Tables 7 and 8 respectively.
While these estimates vary across the different methods they present a similar pattern. The initial effect of SEAM, when the threat was perceived to be credible, was very large: participation rates rose in one year by 16-20 percentage points above an average base rate of 68%, then declined in one year by about 10 percentage points, once it became clear that the threat was not carried out; and reached a participation rate 5 to 8 percentage points above pre-SEAM levels in 2012, the last year in our study.
The initial effect of SEAM on the share of the cohort achieving minimum standard in the first year of implementation, when the threat was perceived to be credible, was also large: an increase of between 5 and 10 percentage points above an average base rate of 32%. This was followed by a large decline the following year of between 3 to 5 percentage points, and share levels in 2012 that were 1 to 4 percentage points above pre-SEAM levels.
Conclusion
Australia except in a handful of cases, and this was observed and became widely known, participation rates fell off substantially in the following year, and subsequent years saw most but not all of the gains evaporating. Participation rates in 2012, the last year in our study, remained significantly above pre-SEAM participation rates but nearly all the gains in the share of the cohort achieving minimum standard had disappeared by then.
These findings demonstrate that a credible threat to link welfare payments to school attendance can be highly effective, at least in the short run. At the same time they also demonstrate the difficulty of following through on such threats, even in the unique circumstances of SEAM, which leant them their initial credibility. Once the threat proved hollow, most of the initial gains were reversed, indicating that many of the parents coerced into sending their children to school by SEAM did not come to appreciate the value of schooling for their children through this experience. This suggests that even credible efforts to enforce compulsory schooling by linking welfare payments to school attendance, or other punitive action, will not be fully effective in the longer term unless they are accompanied by measures that increase parents' and children's appreciation of the value of schooling. 
